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Bangladesh and India Sharing fifty-four trans-boundary rivers water that flows from India 
to Bangladesh. Bangladesh is mostly dependent on India for their water and has no control 
over the water shed management policy of the rivers. Being a smaller, weaker military and 
economy than India, Bangladesh cannot influence the watershed management policies and 
face floods and water scarcity, reducing yield production and fish productivity, an ecological 
imbalance in estuarine areas, saline water intrusion in the southwestern part of Bangladesh 
and reduced navigation. Water governance is the combination of the political, social, 
economic and administrative system, which manage the water resources and provide 
services in the different level of society. Based on the water governance definition the 
researchers find out the different stakeholder in the management of water governance and 
the lack of practices of the theoretical concept of water governance and try to indicate the 
possibilities of the better solutions (Conflict or cooperation) of this trans-boundary water 
conflicts between both countries. The paper also compared the present negotiation process 
with different kinds of modes of wicked problem in water resource management. The study 
recommends few suggestions to minimize the conflict over the utilization of trans-boundary 
water resources management for example, a hydro-community like EU water framework 
Directive that is based on the soft power of peer review rather than a penalizing measure. 
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Bangladesh and India are South Asian countries. 
Bangladesh shared 4094 km of land borders with 
India on three sides and the fourth side is opened 
with Bay of Bengal (Dutta, 2010). There are 
various issues between Bangladesh and India 
needs to resolve. Sharing water of fifty-four trans-
boundary rivers (Sood and Mathukumalli, 2011) 
that flows from India to Bangladesh is one of the 
major issues to resolve. Bangladesh is mostly 
dependent on India for their water and has no 
control over the water shed management policy of 
the rivers. Being a smaller, weaker military and 
economy than India, Bangladesh cannot 
influence the watershed management policies 
(Sood and Mathukumalli, 2011) and face floods 
and water scarcity, reducing yield production and 
fish productivity, an ecological imbalance in 
estuarine areas, saline water intrusion in the 
southwestern part of Bangladesh and reduced 
navigation. Being a smaller country, Bangladesh 
has less opportunity to bargain over the water 
issues with India. As a powerful actor, India tends 
to gain hegemony over other actors especially on 
the lower riparian country Bangladesh that is also 
found in the river Scheldt case (Buuren and 
Warner, 2009). In both countries the conflict 
resolution mechanism is mainly is state 
dependent and other relevant stakeholder 
remains neglected. Access to water, lack of 
transparency and accountability and water rights 
was always overlooked by India, and the 
conditions remain so (Mayers et al., 2009) 
According to Rogers and Hall (2003), water 
governance is the combination of the political, 
social, economic and administrative system, 
which manages the water resources and provide 
services in the different level of society. Whereas 
Moench et al. (2003) thought that water 
governance is a decision-making process, which 
shows the path to the decision maker that how a 
decision will be made, who will make the 
decisions under the particular circumstances. 
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Water governance definition suggests embracing 
different formal and informal institutions in the 
management of water. According to the 
description, the researchers find the different 
stakeholder in the management of water 
governance and the lack of practices of the 
theoretical concept of water governance and try 
to indicate the possibilities of the better solutions 
(Conflict or cooperation) of this trans-boundary 
water conflicts between both countries. 
Therefore, the paper compared the present 
negotiation process with different kinds of modes 
of wicked problem in water resource management 
(Lach et al., 2005). This paper will also try to 
indicate the track followed and still following in 
the river Teesta regime.  
 
History of this trans-boundary water conflicts 
 
The GBM (Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna) is one 
of the most extensive freshwater river flows in the 
world.  The Ganges originated from Himalaya, 
and before entering into Bangladesh, it flows 
about 1500 km (Chowdhury and Ward, 2007). 
The Brahmaputra originated from Tibet plateau 
and crossed northeastern part of India to open in 
Bangladesh. These two rivers come together 
inside Bangladesh and Ganges named as the 
Padma. The Padma flows 150 km to join with the 
river Meghna and drain in the Bay of Bengal. 
Bangladesh, Nepal, India, China, and Bhutan are 
considered the users of this vast GBM basin 
(Tradewell and Ali, 2009).  
 
Sharing trans-boundary Rivers causing socio-
political issues since the birth of India and 
Bangladesh (Formerly East Pakistan). India-
Bangladesh trans-boundary water conflict started 
to the early 1970s (Islam, 2012). Hundreds of 
millions of people are living around the bank of 
the shared rivers, dependents on their livelihoods 
(Social and economic) and cultural lives (Rahman 
et  al., 2000). A conflict arises due to water 
sharing and controlling of demand and supplies 
of water in both up and downstream (Uprety, 
2012). The primary conflicts between Bangladesh 
and India started on the building of Farraka dam 
in 1961 on the Ganges river to maintain the 
navigability of Calcutta port, near the border of 
Bangladesh which was operated in 1975 
(Tanzeema and Faisal, 2001). Water flow in the 
Bangladesh part considerably low since the 
barrage started its operation and Bangladesh 
faces a serious drought problems and saltwater 
intrusion problem in the Southwestern of 
Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2000). As a 
downstream riparian country freshwater 
availability of Bangladesh totally dependent on 
the Upstream India and faced 50% decrease the 
flow amount of water in the dry season and since 
the commissioning of the barrage in 1975 
(Tradewell and Ali, 2009). Similarly, India 
planned to divert water from the river 
Brahmaputra to the Farakka. By considering the 
adverse impact of the plan to the riparian 
country, Bangladesh objected and the negotiation 
continued without any result (Kristian et al., 
2013). The former Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi was unwilling to operate the Farakka 
barrage without the consent from Bangladesh but 
situation changed after the assassination of the 
Former Bangladesh President Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman (Kristian et al., 2013). Later, India 
withdrawal the bilateral negotiations about the 
water sharing with the Former President Ziaur 
Rahman in 1976. India started to use the water 
unilaterally and when Ziaur Rahman approached 
India for discussion but there was no response 
from other party. So, the issue internationalized 
in the UN General assembly in 1976. Besides this, 
the conflict rages over the Teesta water sharing 
(Islam, 2011). Due to the India's internal 
requirement they have unilaterally divert policy 
and withdraw water from those trans-
boundary/International rivers (Ramaswamy, 
1997). Without any agreement with Bangladesh, 
India has started to build several dams from 
many trans-boundary rivers such as, Teesta, 
Gumti, Khowai, Dharla, Dudhkumar, Monuetc 
and also blocked many rivers such as Muhri, 
Chagalnaiya, Fulchuri, Kachu and many others 
which flow from Tripura (India) to Bangladesh 
(Islam, 2012). Bangladeshi water expert said that 
India has heavily modified the flow of 48 out of 
54 rivers and that is heavily affecting the 
economy of Bangladesh (Kristian et al., 2013). 
Recently, Indian high court approved a 
controversial river diversion project in which 
India can link Brahmaputra and Ganges River by 
a canal to store the excess water of Brahmaputra 
to the Ganges. Dhaka is also concern about this 
controversial river linking project.  Moreover, the 
recent Tipaimukh dam construction in the river 
Barak River of the Indian state of Manipur, 
Mizoram and Assam added a new fume to this 
long trans-boundary water conflict issues in both 
countries (Kristian et al., 2013). Dam 
construction over the Barak River has adverse 
effect on the flow of Surma and Kushiara River on 
the northeastern region of Bangladesh. 
 
Materials and Methods  
 
Secondary data source used for this paper to 
analyze the trans-boundary water conflicts 
between Bangladesh and India. Moreover, 
different papers, journals, websites, used during 
the whole work process and content of this paper 
based on the summarized view of those sources. 
Discussion and conclusion is completely the 
writer's personal understanding based on 
qualitative analysis of the existing literature and 
the analysis available on the issues. The trans-
boundary water issues of Bangladesh divided into 
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three sections- water scarcity, susceptibility to 
flooding and water quality. 
 
Analysis of the problem 
 
During the analysis of the problem various power 
conflicts, economic incentives over water conflicts 
for a successful negotiation, impact of water crisis 
on the environment will focus.  
 
The Teesta regime 
 
The Teesta is the fourth major trans-boundary 
rivers of Bangladesh and India after the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra and Meghna (Uprety and Salman, 
2011). An agreement signed between Bangladesh 
and India to share the Teesta water as 36% for 
Bangladesh and 39% for India. The remaining 
25% would leave unallocated for the natural flow 
of Teesta River in 1983.  Two countries decided to 
have complete scientific studies to share the 
water. Joint Teesta commission established to 
fulfill this purpose. Due to Teesta Barrage and 
several hydroelectric dam constructions, the river 
heavily silted. The river has changed its courses in 
many places of lower stream Bangladesh and 
every year engulfing thousands of hectares land. 
The dream of irrigating to increase the agriculture 
production becomes failure in both countries 
(Uprety and Salman, 2011). Expert revealed that 
due to the water scarcity, the Teesta barrage will 
lose its usefulness and there is a possibility of 
death of the river. Both countries involved the 
chairperson of the irrigation department to find 
out the way for the sharing arrangements into a 
formal documentation. However, the new 
bilateral treaty discussed to sign on 2012 to 
allocate the equal portion of water in both 
countries but the West Bengal Chief Minister Ms. 
Mamata Banarjee denied the treaty with an 
excuse that the state government did not have 
enough discussion with the West Bengal 
Government regarding these issues. She also 
mentioned that if this treaty has signed then it 
has adverse irrigation impact on their part. As 
water is a state asset of India and State 
Government has a coalition with the Mamata's 
Trinomul Party, State Government did not 
proceed without further consultation with West 
Bengal Government (Prasai and Mandakini, 
2013). Again, failure to sign Teesta agreement, 
the bilateral discussion about the transit facilities 
for India through Bangladesh slowed down and 
the fate of the sharing of other trans-boundary 
river hanged on (Prasai and Mandakini, 2013). 
Despite having of several meeting with Joint 
River Commission, Joint Expert Committee, 
Joint Technical Group, the bilateral discussion 
between Bangladesh and India now become 
intractable. The discussion was technical in 
nature with a very small room for discussion of 
social and ecological issues or other stakeholders. 
Public participation and civil society engagement 
was very narrow in this whole process of 
negotiation. After considering the whole scenario 
of Teesta river regime, the water governance in 
this region falls in track 1 type of water 
governance (Dore, 2007). Track 1 type of water 
governance involves government in a formal and 
informal way with bureaucracy in an intra and 
interstate forum (Dore, 2007).  The decision 
making process is more official in this type of 
water governance. The dominant logic behind 
this track is accepting the implicit rational 
dominancy (Dore, 2007); and focused on the self-
interested behavior that is completely visible in 
the trans-boundary water issue management in 
Bangladesh and India. 
 
This type of water governance has mostly 
followed the mode 1 (Lach et al., 2005) where the 
governance design is mostly in technical where 
engineers and hydrologist are more critical 
stakeholder who treats water as a natural 
resource and built water systems and overlook all 
related uncertainty. In this Teesta regime, the 
same things happen at the beginning of the 
barrage building where the two-state gives 
concentration to those stakeholders and avoided 
related risk and uncertainty. 
 
With the year, passing the water management 
situation in this barrage was in danger and new 
stakeholders showed up their face in the 
negotiation process, so the problem becomes a 
wicked problem. Different stakeholders bringing 
further information are inevitable. It is not 
possible to solve by a single organization and the 
one solution for one generation may have a 
problem for others. In this case, when the two-
state faced the challenge then the commission 
asked to study the issue further, create new 
knowledge and find further solutions. Therefore, 
we find a shifting of track 1 type of governance to 
track 2 governance and the water management 
mode 2 (Lach et al., 2005). It is not possible to 
say that water management mode has completely 
shifted from mode 1 to mode 2 but we can say 
that the management system is changing, though 
the power is still on the government hand. In this 
Teesta regime more stakeholders forcefully joined 
as a stakeholder but they were not indeed invited 
to cooperate or allowed to say. 
 
In this Teesta regime, we find "soft power' is 
exercised where problems are framing and 
reframing and had an active attempt to influence 
the actors in the decision-making process. In the 
case of weak power utilization, it has discussed 
that why the other actors will coexist, goes along, 
or not resist, or aligned with the interest of 
another party, though it is ethically not correct. 
There are so many reasons behind this such as in 
the real world, there are winners and losers in the 
trans-boundary water management and 
negotiation process. The interest of one party 
intertwined with the interest of another party 
(Zeitoun et al., 2011).  There is a myth that India 
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helps Awami League (AL) to be in power, which is 
similar to soft power using in the trans-boundary 
negotiation.  
 
In a trans-boundary water interaction in an 
integrative exercise, one actor may be framed the 
issue in a way that other parties accept the 
portrayal without any question. This case is very 
similar to India-Bangladesh trans-boundary 
water issue problem where Bangladesh accept 
India's negotiation strategy without questioning. 
It has believed that the official consensus between 
Bangladesh and India focused on the politically 
feasible pragmatic way to manage the water 
conflicts in which it is also overlooked that how 
much compliance is achieved.  It is temporary 
and stabilizes the cause of conflict, but it is better 
than ignoring the issues that are also describe by 
Zeitoun et al. (2011). When the soft power used in 
a hegemonic trans-boundary water arrangement, 
then it is shown that soft power can lunch or 
turned off the options for the other riparian 
actors for example more powerful side India can 
shape up the outcome of the discussion. It 
indicates by Zeitoun et al. (2011) that unbalanced 
hegemonic bargain is more easily preserve than 
altered. 
 
In the case of Teesta regime, the hegemony has 
its clearance in a more integrative way to manage 
the trans-boundary arrangement. To achieve a 
"carrot" in a privileged way both countries 
extended their hand is, of course, a common. For 
example, Bangladesh agreed to provide the 
corridor to India for their connection with the 
mainland, and land-locked northeastern state for 
their transportation and India proposed to share 
Teesta water equally (Islam, 2012). However, the 
treaty has not signed, this type of agreement 
verbally done between the Government of 
Bangladesh and India. There are many examples 
of such regional co-operations around the world 
where the incentives often not directly relate to 
the water-related issues, for example, Turkey and 
Syria Euphrates river water sharing (Zeitoun et 
al., 2011). 
 
Water politics in the trans-boundary 
water sharing 
 
The trans-boundary water issue is a severe socio-
political issue in Indo-Bangla region (Formerly 
East Pakistan) (Tradewell and Ali, 2009). 
 
There are always a considerable uncertainty and 
less information about the impact of water 
management and dam building in the Tipaimukh 
area. However, it becomes a political challenge 
both in Bangladesh and in Northeast of India. In 
India, it showed a state-society conflict 
(Yumnam, 2014). In Bangladesh, Civil society 
comes forward against the Tipaimukh dam 
construction, for example, they set up a 
committee named as a Tipaimukh Dam 
Resistance Committee. In Bangladesh Sylhet area 
will be profoundly affected if the dam is built so, 
local people organize a committee to protest the 
dam namely Unnayan Sangram Committee. Not 
only that the political parties also made a 
coalition of all parties including the CPB 
(Communist Party of Bangladesh). In the national 
state, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) the 
then opposition party of Bangladesh, highly 
criticize the decision of India's dam-building 
efforts (Kristian et al., 2013).  
 
It has always been revealed that when Awami 
League (AL) into the power of Bangladesh they 
still follow the conciliatory policy with India. It 
has also proved during the Ganges treaty in 1996. 
Therefore, Awami League (AL) Government 
answered the critics of the opposition party that 
no dam will construct until AL is in Government, 
which also expressed the closeness of AL with 
India. However, it has proved that the both 
Government of two countries lost their credibility 
(Kristian et al., 2013).  
 
Teesta river negotiation hanged on because of the 
Indian internal politics and struggle of the state 
center power. They showed up their face and 
entered into the negotiation process. Though the 
agreement was negotiated by the Government of 
India and Bangladesh, pulling out immediately 
prior the signing in 2011 bilateral meeting of the 
two Government (Kristian et al., 2013), just 
because of the chief minister of the Indian state of 
West Bengal.  
 
Recently, in a public meeting, the former West 
Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Vottacharya 
said that the discussion about the Teesta water 
and eccentricity corridor could be discussed with 
Bangladesh in another rational way. He also 
mentioned that Indian Bengal province want 
good relations with all neighboring countries but 
not at the cost of the friendship of Bangladesh 
(eprothomalo, p .17). 
 
Concerned citizens from Bangladesh shared their 
observation about the deficiency in clearness and 
answerability to the counterparts in Northeast 
India and West Bengal in dam building, water 
diversion project as well as the water sharing 
agreements. India also showed less interest in 
water sharing and failure to share information 
and not progress with the further consultation 
with the stakeholders in Bangladesh. India-
Bangladesh water diplomacy relationship failed 
because of the mistrust, unproductive 
cooperation. Nowadays, civil society comes 
forward as an essential stakeholder in both 
countries with the new alliances in their anti-dam 
movements. Governments in both countries are 
facing a new challenge for the raising of new 
stakeholder. However, this new arising 
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stakeholder giving fresh opportunities for the 
opposition politics (Kristian et al., 2013). 
 
From Conflict to Cooperation 
 
In 2011 when the Prime Minister Manmohan Sing 
visited Dhaka, highlighted the improvement of 
bilateral cooperation on the management of 
shared river (Kristian et al., 2013). The diplomats 
and the leaders in both countries feel the same. 
Though it is still stated dependent, two nations 
agreed to promote trans-boundary water 
management, hydropower development including 
the ecosystem protection. In this case, India tried 
to show cleaner image by inviting delegates from 
parliaments, opposition leaders of Bangladesh 
and the Journalists to the Tipaimukh dam. India 
also agreed to share the environmental 
assessment report and formulated terms of 
references (TOR) in 2012. India also offered 
Bangladesh joint venture hydroelectric project in 
North-East India to increase the power 
production in both countries by sharing both cost 
and benefits.   
 
Awareness is rising in both countries to have an 
integrated water resource management 
approaches in focus with the necessity of multi-
purpose and basin wise cooperation mechanisms 
with different national and international 
stakeholders (Kristian et al., 2013). Experts of the 
participating countries in India's northeast 
hydropower grid will foster the cooperation 
among them.  
 
Moreover, an International organization such as 
Global Water Partnership introduces the 
Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) in Bangladesh and India to set up the 
"3e's" means the efficiency of the water resources, 
equity in allocation in different social and 
economic group and environmental 
sustainability. The present water resource 
management is the more top-down approach, 
technical based and management are 
unsustainable (Kristian et al., 2013). India water 
Partnership (IWP) works with different 
stakeholders including policy makers, donors and 
representative from industry to work on the 
resolutions of interstate trans-boundary water 
sharing and organize a water dialogue. On the 
other hand, Bangladesh Water Partnership 
(BWP) works on flood management, adaptation 
to climate change, trans-boundary water 
cooperation and promoting best practices for 
knowledge sharing. IUCN is trying to set a 
knowledge hub for integrated ecosystem 
management of common water regimes. IUCN 
also showed an active interest in the dialogue in 
water management issues between Bangladesh 
and India (Kristian et al., 2013). It is not always 
correct that relatively weaker party do not get 
benefit from the use of soft power e.g. Egypt-
Sudan Nile treaty which was mentioned as an 
example by Zeitoun et al. (2011).  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
India shared the water from the trans-boundary 
river according to their will and took the 
advantages to be the upper riparian country. In 
existing water sharing policy, there is a lack of 
integrated water sharing management. India 
disobeys the international river law and shows no 
attitude of concession to Bangladesh (Islam, 
2012). Moreover, the political party in 
Bangladesh is another factor to expose the 
policies unsuccessfully. The existing policies are 
not working well because of the lack of regional 
cooperation and conventional wisdom in water 
sharing issues with these countries.  Through this 
study, it has found that there are so many reasons 
behind this lack of consensus about the trans-
boundary issues between Bangladesh and India 
such as lack of political and national consensus, 
selective foreign policy, poor water governance, 
water scarcity in both countries. It suggests that if 
there is no future consensus about the sharing of 
trans-boundary waters, there may be a possible 
inter and intrastate conflicts in both and between 
countries and disease outcome will increase due 
to the lack of fresh water (Islam, 2012). The area, 
population, and size are relatively smaller than 
other trans-boundary river area. By studying all 
the situations and negotiation process, the 
following recommendation is acknowledged.  
 
Recommendation for Bangladesh and India 
 
 Increase the access to the information: This 
is not only recommended for Teesta basin 
but also recommended for other shared 
river basins. This access to data is not only 
for the state sharing but also increase the 
public accessibility into the data. 
 During the dialogues and negotiation, 
consider the entire river basin as a unit of 
analysis considering that basin is more 
important in ecological and economical than 
a fixed use of it. 
 Paradigm is shifting from track two process 
to track-3 for a new starting of negotiations. 
 Discuss the interchange of tradable and 
sharable benefits in the water sharing a 
negotiable table: It has already seen in the 
negotiation of the Teesta river regime. 
 Civil Society Organization (CSO) should 
come forward with advocacy and 
intermediary roles, but trust building is 
more important to engage in this issues. 
CSO should more link with the grassroots 
people and help to mobilize them for 
coalition about the shared interest. 
 Donor organization should come forward 
for capacity building and provide support in 
the negotiation process as non-state actor.  
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It is also recommending that Bangladesh and 
other South Asian countries may build up a 
hydro-community like EU water framework 
Directive that is based on the soft power of peer 
review rather than a penalizing measure. It is to 
notifying that the inter-state water conflict in this 
state in the adverse situation never understood 
and addressed in the same way that European 
Union faces in their water conflict issues. 
Therefore, the trans-disciplinary water conflict is 
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